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1. Introduction
In the last three decades several developed and developing countries have moved
towards liberalization of their financial system. Countries eased or lifted bank interest rate
ceilings, lowered compulsory reserve requirements and entry barriers, reduced government
interference in credit allocation decisions, and privatized many banks and insurance
companies. Also, some countries actively promoted the development of local stock markets,
and encouraged entry of foreign financial intermediaries.
Generally, the trend towards financial liberalization is part of a broader trend towards
reduced direct intervention of the state in the economy. In a number of developing countries,
however, financial liberalization  is also a deliberate attempt to move away from "financial
repression" as a policy to fund government fiscal imbalances and subsidize priority sectors, a
move strongly advocated by the influential work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973).
According to McKinnon and Shaw, financial repression, by forcing financial institutions to pay
low and often negative real interest rates, reduces private financial savings, thereby decreasing
the resources available to finance capital accumulation. From this perspective, through
financial liberalization developing countries can stimulate domestic savings and growth, and
reduce excessive dependence on foreign capital flows.'
The work of McKinnon and Shaw also stimulated a fast-growing strand of research
that analyzes how linancial development can stimulate economic growth by accelerating
' Empirical research on the relationship between interest rates and savings in countries that
liberalize financial markets has generally failed to find clear evidence of a significant  and
sizable positive correlation. This failure is generally attributed to the strong positive wealth
effect of interest rate increases (see Fry, 1997, for a survey). However, empirical studies tend
to support the proposition that moderately positive real interest rates have a positive effect on
growth (see, among others, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 and Bandiera and others, 1997).3
productivity growth rather than through saving mobilization (see Levine, 1997, for a survey). 2
This research includes a number of empirical studies on the relationship between financial
development and growth; most studies find various measures of financial development to be
positively correlated with both contemporaneous and future growth rates of GDP, suggesting
that financial liberalization, by fostering financial development, can increase the long-run
growth rate of the economy (King and Levine, 1993).
This positive view of financial liberalization, however, is somewhat clouded by the
marked increase in financial fragility experienced by both developed and developing countries
in the 1980s and 1990s. Particularly, banking sectors around the world were hit by a
remarkable number of problems, some of which erupted in full-fledged systemic crises as
documented in the extensive studies of Caprio and Kliengebiel (1995) and Lindgren, Garcia,
and Saal (1996). In a number of cases, for example in Chile in 1981, banking sector problems
emerged shortly after the financial sector was deregulated. 3 These experiences suggest that the
benefits of financial  liberalization may have to be weighed against the cost of increased
financial fragility, and some prominent voices in the policy debate have taken the view that
2 Financial markets allow agents to diversify and hedge risk, thereby making high-risk, high-
return investments attractive to investors; financial  markets also allow the pooling of liquidity
risk, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983); stock markets disseminate information over corporate
values (although -- if information revelation is too extensive this may actually make incentives
for information collection too low, as argued by Stiglitz, 1985), and allow the market for
corporate control to emerge. Financial intermediaries, such as banks, make savings available
to entrepreneurs who may lack own resources to finance investment and technology
acquisition; they also screen and monitor loan applicants, thereby improving the allocation of
resources. By exploiting economies of scale, intermediaries can also make saving mobilization
more efficient (Levine, 1997).
3 The Chilean experience, which shares many features with the current East Asian crises, is
analyzed in Diaz-Alejandro (1985). Other case studies of banking crises are presented in
Sundararajan and Balifio (1991), Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995), and Sheng (1995)4
some degree of iEnancial  regulation is preferable to premature liberalization in developing
countries (Caprio and Summers, 1993, Stiglitz, 1994).
While the link between financial development and economic growth has been
documented through careful empirical studies, the connection between financial liberalization
and financial fragility has not been the object of systematic econometric investigation so far.
This paper is an attempt to fill this gap. Building upon our previous research on the
determinants of banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997), we construct a
financial liberalization dummy variable for a large number of developed and developing
countries during 1980-95. To date liberalization we choose an observable policy change,
namely the deregulation of bank interest rates, since case studies indicate that this is often the
centerpiece of the overall liberalization process. The data set encompasses countries that
liberalized  financial markets well before the 1980s as well as countries that liberalized at
different dates during the sample period. Using a multivariate logit framework, we test
whether banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalized financial systems when other
factors that may increase the probability of a crisis are controlled for. The set of control
variables includes macroeconomic variables, characteristics of the banking sector, and
institutional variables. We also test whether crises are more likely to occur during the
transition to a less controlled financial system, or if fragility is a permanent feature of
liberalization.
Another issue often raised in the debate over financial liberalization is whether the
dangers of liberalization are greater in countries where the institutions needed to support the
efficient functioning of financial markets are not well developed. Such institutions include
effective prudential regulation and supervision of financial intermediaries and of organized5
security exchanges, and a well-functioning mechanism  to enforce contracts and regulations.
We investigate this issue by testing whether the relationship between banking crises and
liberalization is stronger in countries with weaker institutional environments, as proxied by
GDP per capita and various indexes of institutional quality. Finally, we subject our results to a
variety of robustness checks.
The general result is that banking crises are indeed more likely to occur in countries
with a liberalized financial sector, even when other factors (including the real interest rate) are
controlled for; furthermore, increased banking sector fragility is not a characteristic of the
immediate aftermath of liberalization;  rather, it tends to surface a f.ew  years after the
liberalization process begins. The data also support the conjecture that a weak institutional
environment makes liberalization more likely to lead to a banking crisis; specifically,  in
countries were the rule of law is weak, corruption is widespread, the bureaucracy is
inefficient, and contract enforcement mechanisms are ineffective financial liberalization tends
to have a particularly large impact on the probability of a banking crisis. Thus, there is clear
evidence that financial liberalization has costs in terms of increased financial fragility especially
in developing countries, where the institutions needed to support a well-functioning financial
system are generally not well-established.
To explore a possible channel through which liberalization may affect bank fragility,
we use bank level data to examine the correlation between variables proxing bank franchise
values and the financial liberalization dummy variable. We find evidence that franchise values
tend to be lower when financial markets are liberalized, possibly because bank monopolistic
power is eroded. This suggests that theories attributing increased moral hazard to low bank6
franchise  value  may  help explain  why financial  liberalization  tends to make  banking  crises
more likely  (Caprio  and Summers,  1993,  and Hellman,  Murdock  and Stiglitz,  1994).
These  findings  raise  the question  of whether  the many  benefits  of financial
liberalization  highlighted  in the literature  may  not be offset  by the costs in terms of greater
vulnerability  to banking  crises.  A rigorous  answer  to this complex  question  is beyond  the
scope of this paper. Nonetheless,  using our data set we attempt  to throw some  light  on one
particular  aspect of the issue, namely  the effect  of financial  liberalization  and banking  crises  on
financial  development  and growth.  First, we show  that financial  development  is positively
correlated  with output growth  in our sample,  confirming  the results of King and Levine
(1993). Second,  we find  that, conditional  on no banking  crisis,  countries/time  periods  in which
financial  markets  are liberalized  have  higher  financial  development  that countries/time  periods
in which  markets  are controlied. However,  countries/time  periods  with both financial
liberalization  and a banking  crisis  have approximately  the same  level of financial  development
as countries/time  periods  with neither,  so that the net effect  on growth through  financial
development  is not significantly  different  from zero.
To explore  this issue  further,  we split  the sample  between  countries  that were
financially  repressed  at the time of liberalization  and countries  that were financially  restrained,
where the state of financial  repression  (restraint)  is identified  by the presence  of negative
(positive)  interest  rates in the period before  liberalization.  The same  tests described  above  are
then performed  for the two subsamples.  For the restrained  group, the results  resemble  those
for the whole sample.  In contrast,  for the repressed  group financial  liberalization  is
accompanied  by higher  financial  development  even  if a banking  crisis  also takes place.  These
findings  suggest  that financial  liberalization  is likely  to have a positive  effect  on growth7
through  financial  development  in countries  characterized  by financial  repression,  even  if it
increases  financial  fragility.
The paper  is organized  as follows:  the next section  reviews  the mechanisms  through
which  financial  deregulation  may  increase  banking  sector fragility.  Section  3 describes  the data
set and explains  the methodology  used in the empirical  tests. Section  4 contains  the main
results,  while  Section 5 summarizes  the outcome  of various  sensitivity  tests. Section  6
discusses  the relationship  between  liberalization  and bank franchise  value. Section  7 discusses
the effects  of financial  liberalization  and banking  crises  on financial  development  and growth.
Finally,  Section  8 concludes.
2. Theory
While  the focus of this paper is primarily  empirical,  to put the empirical  results  in
perspective  it is usefal  to briefly  review  some  of the theoretical  reasons  why  a liberalized
banking  system  may  be more  vulnerable  to crises.
In tightly  controlled  financial  systems,  bank lending  interest rates are usually  subject  to
ceilings,  which  make it impossible  for banks to charge  high  risk premia.  Thus, loans  to high
risk customers  cannot  be profitable.  As ceilings  are lifted  during  financial  liberalization,  it
becomes  possible  for banks  to finance  riskier  ventures  in return  for a higher  promised  return.
Indeed,  one of the benefits  of financial  liberalization  is that socially  desirable  high-risk,  high-
return projects  will find  the necessary  financing. 4 If loan-specific  risk is hedged  by holding  a
4 In some  countries,  the authorities  may  explicitly  forbid  commercial  banks from entering
certain  segments  of the credit  market  that are deemed  excessively  risky, such as credit  to
security  dealers. Such  restrictions  are sometimes  relaxed  as part of the liberalization  process.8
well-diversified  portfolio,  then financing  riskier  loans  need  not increase  the risk of bank
insolvency  nor, at am  aggregate  level,  the risk of a systemic  banking  crisis.  However,
portfolios  of risky loans,  even  if they are well-diversified,  are typically  still  vulnerable  to the
risk of economy-wide  adverse  shocks  (such as a recession).  Also,  managing  the risk of a bank
loan portfolio  is a complex  task, and bank staff  trained in a tightly  regulated  financial  system
may  not have  the skills  and experience  necessary.  Evaluation  of risky  investment  projects and
monitoring  of the borrower  during  the life of the loan also require  skills  that may  be in short
supply  in a banking  system  where  lending  to the government  and collateral-based  private
lending  were the primary  activities  for many  years. Such skills  may  also be difficult  to import
from abroad.
In a liberalized  financial  system  where  interest rates are market-determined,  nominal
interest  rates are likely  to be more  variable  than in a controlled  one (although  real rates  may
not be) 5; since  one of the functions  of banks  as financial  intermediaries  is to "transform"  short-
term liabilities  (deposits)  into long-term  assets (business  and consumer  loans),  banks  are
exposed  to the risk of an increase  in nominal  interest  rates, and  may  become  more  vulnerable
in an environment  where  interest  rates are more  volatile.  Also,  when  liberalization  takes place
before a well-developed  interbank  market  develops,  banks may  find it difficult  to deal  with
temporary  liquidity  shortages,  unless  the central  bank is ready  to step in. Liquidity  problems  at
an individual  bank may  spread  to other banks and become  a panic  when agents  are imperfectly
informed,  as described  by Chari  and  Jagannathan  (1988).
5  This  problem  is exacerbated  if financial  liberalization  takes place  before  macroeconomic
stabilization,  as emphasized  by McKinnon  (1993).9
Since liberalization increases the opportunity for banks to take on risk, any mechanism
that may prevent bank managers from appropriately evaluating the downside risk of their
lending decisions becomes especially dangerous. Clearly, limited liability is such a mechanism.
The presence of implicit or explicit government guarantees to depositors and/or other bank
claimholders makes moral hazard even more dangerous. As emphasized by Caprio and
Summers (1993) and Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, (1994), another factor that may
contribute to moral hazard is the erosion of bank franchise value due to the removal of
ceilings on deposit interest rates and to the reduction of other barriers to entry: as
monopolistic profits disappear due to increased bank competition, the cost of losing a banking
license when the bank becomes insolvent is reduced, and incentives to choose a riskier loan
portfolio increase. Unless these perverse incentives are controlled through effective prudential
regulation and supervision, increased risk taking due to moral hazard can become a powerful
source of financial  fragility, as demonstrated in numerous banking crisis episodes.
In many countries financial  liberalization was accompanied by the reduction or
removal of controls on international capital movements. This process opened the way for the
newly liberalized financial intermediaries to take on yet another type of risk, foreign exchange
risk, by raising funds in foreign currency on international markets and lending them to local
borrowers. Prudential limits on foreign currency exposure were often circumvented in various
ways, or currency risk was transformed into credit risk by lending in foreign currency to
unhedged domestic borrowers; not surprisingly, currency crises often preceded or
accompanied banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996).
To summarize, financial liberalization, by giving banks and other financial
intermediaries more freedom of action, increases the opportunities to take on risk. This tends10
to increase financial  fragility, but it is not necessarily bad for the economy, as high-risk, high-
returns investment projects may dominate low risk-low return ventures. However, because of
limited liability compounded with other forms of implicit and explicit guarantees, bankers'
appetite for risk is likely to be far greater than what is socially desirable. If prudential
regulation and supervision are not effective at controlling bank behavior and at realigning
incentives, liberalization may increase financial fragility well above what is socially desirable.
Also, to the extent that the skills to screen and monitor risky borrowers and to manage a risky
loan portfolio, as well as the skills to perform efficient supervision, can only be acquired
gradually and through "learning-by-doing", banks in newly liberalized systems are likely to be
more vulnerable.
All these considerations suggest that, other things being equal, the risk of bank
insolvency and, more generally, of systemic banking crises may be greater in liberalized
financial systems. In the next section, we perform an econometric test of various aspects of
this linkage.
3.  Data and Methodology
The Sample
To select which countries to include in the panel, we began with all the countries in the
International Financial Statistics of the IMF except for centrally planned economies and
economies in transition. To obtain a sufficiently  large number of time series, we decided to
limit our study to the 1980-95 period; as will be shown below, this period includes a
substantial number of banking crises and of financial liberalization episodes, so that the data11
set is sufficiently  rich for the purposes of our investigation. 6 Some countries had to be
eliminated  because of missing data, or because we could not find sufficient information on
financial liberalization. A few countries were left out because their banking systems were in a
state of chronic distress for the entire period under consideration, and it was therefore
impossible to pinpoint a specific subperiod as a banking crisis period. Finally, two countries
(Argentina, and Bolivia) were excluded because they are outliers with respect to two of the
regressors that we use (inflation and the real interest rate). 7 This process of elimination  left us
with 53 countries in the baseline specification (see Table 1).
A Multivariate Logit Model
To identify the impact of financial liberalization on financial fragility we estimate the
probability of a banking crisis using a multivariate logit model, and we test the hypothesis that
a dummy variable capturing whether the financial system is liberalized or not significantly
increases the probability of a crisis when other factors are controlled for. Accordingly, our
dependent variable, the banking crisis dummy, is equal to zero if there is no banking crisis, and
it is equal to one if there is a crisis. The probability  that a crisis will occur at a particular time
in a particular country is hypothesized to be a function of a vector of n variables X(i, t)
including the financial liberalization dummy variable and n-  I control variables. Let P(i, t)
6  to lack of data, for some countries the observations included in the panel do not cover
the entire 1980-95 period.
' If the outliers are introduced in the panel, the results do not change much, except that the
estimated coefficient for inflation and the real interest rate become smaller. Peru also had a
hyperinflation during the sample period, but the hyperinflation years are excluded from the
panel because of missing data.12
denote a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a banking crisis occurs in country i
and time t and a value of zero otherwise. P is a vector of n unknown coefficients and F(j3'X(i,
t)) is the cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at P3  'X(i, t). Then, the log-
likelihood function of the model is:
Ln L =  t- t 1 ..T = 1..n{P(i,t)ln[F(P3'X(i,t))]  + (1-P(i,t))  ln[1- F(P'X(i,t))]}.
To model the probability distribution function F we use the logistic functional form, thus the
estimated coefficients do not indicate the increase in the probability of a crisis given a one-unit
increase in the corresponding explanatory variables as in standard linear regression models.
Instead, the coefficients capture the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on
ln(P(i,t)/(1-P(i,t)).  Therefore, while the sign of the coefficient does indicate the direction of
the change, the magnitude depends on the slope of the cumulative distribution function at
(3  'X(i,t).
After the onset of a banking crisis, the behavior of some of the explanatory variables is
likely to be affected by the crisis itself; since these feed-back effects would muddle the
estimation, years in which banking crises are under way are eliminated  from the panel. 8 Also,
the probability that a crisis occurs in a country that had problems in the past is likely to differ
from that of a country where no crisis ever occurred. To take this dependence into account,
we include different additional regressors in the estimated equations such as the number of
past crises, the duration of the last spell, and the time since the last crisis.
8 See Section 5 on sensitivity analysis  for alternative approaches.13
The Banking Crisis Variable
To construct a banking crisis dummy variable, we have identified and dated episodes
of banking sector distress during the period 1980-95 using primarily two recent studies,
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996). For an episode of
distress to be classified as a full-fledged crisis, we established -- somewhat arbitrarily -- that at
least one of the following conditions must apply: the ratio of non-performing assets to total
assets in the banking system exceeded 10 percent; the cost of the rescue operation was at least
2 percent of GDP; banking sector problems resulted in a large scale nationalization of banks;
extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged
bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were enacted by the government in response
to the crisis. In Section 5 below we explore the sensitivity of the results to the definition of a
crisis. To establish the length of the crisis, we relied solely on the dates provided by the case
studies.  A list of the crisis episodes is presented in Table 1.
The Financial Liberalization Variable
Empirical studies of financial liberalization have often used the real interest rate as a
proxy for financial liberalization (Fry, 1997 and Bandiera and others, 1997). Real interest
rates, however, especially when measured ex post, are likely to be affected by a variety of
factors that have little to do with changes in the regulatory framework of financial markets.
This problem may be limited in a cross-country study, in which interest rates are averaged
over long periods of time, but in a panel study like ours with an important time-series
dimension proxying financial liberalization with the real interest rate would be potentially14
misleading.  For instance, a positive correlation between real interest rates and the probability
of a banking crisis may simply reflect the fact that both variables tend to be high during
cyclical economic downturns, while financial liberalization plays no role.
To avoid this problem, in this study we construct a financial liberalization variable
based on observed policy changes. This strategy, however, is not without its difficulties:  first,
no available data base records such policy changes, and we had to resort to case studies, IF
country reports, and other miscellaneous sources of information. Furthermore, the process of
financial liberalization has taken many different forms: some countries eliminated some
restrictions before others; some countries, such as Greece or Japan, opted for a very gradual
approach, while others like Egypt or Mexico switched regime quite rapidly; also, in some
cases there were temporary reversals. After reviewing our information sources, it became
clear that in most countries the removal of interest rate controls was the centerpiece of the
liberalization process; thus, we chose this policy change as the indicator of financial
liberalization. This left us with the choice of what to consider as the beginning date in
countries where the process was gradual. Lacking a good theoretical ground for preferring
one option over another, we chose the first year in which some interest rates were liberalized
as the beginning date because it was easier to identify. Table 1 shows the dates of interest rate
liberalization for the countries in our sample. For some countries, two sets of dates are
entered because liberalization was temporarily reversed.  While 63 percent of our observations
are classified as periods of liberalization, 78 percent of banking crises occurred in periods of
financial liberalization.
The Control Variables15
The set of control variables is taken from our previous study of banking crises
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997), and it reflects both the theory of the determinants of
banking crises and data availability. 9 A list of the variables and their sources is in the data
appendix. The first group of control variables captures macroeconomic developments that
affect bank performance especially through the level of non-performing loans; this group
includes the rate of growth of real GDP, the external terms of trade, and the rate of inflation.
The real short-term interest rate is also introduced as a control variable because, whether
financial markets are liberalized or not, banking sector problems are more likely to emerge if
real interest rates are high." 0 The second set of control variables includes characteristics of the
banking system, such as vulnerability to sudden capital outflows (measured by the ratio of M2
to foreign exchange reserves, as suggested by Calvo, 1996), liquidity (measured by the ratio
of bank cash and reserves to bank assets), exposure to the private sector (measured by the
ratio of loans to the private sector to total loans), and lagged credit growth. This last variable
is introduced because high rates of credit expansion may finance an asset price bubble that,
when it bursts, causes a banking crisis. Finally, GDP per-capita is used to control for the level
of development of the country.
Measures of Institutional Ouality
9  For more details on the relationship between the theory of banking crises and the choice of
control variables, see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).
10 To minimize potential endogeneity problems, to measure the real interest rate we use the
rate on short-term government paper or a central bank rate, such as the discount rate, and not
a bank interest rate. In six countries, however, neither measure was available, and we used the
bank deposit rate.16
Since the quality of institutions may affect the degree to which financial liberalization
increases the probability of a banking crisis, in alternative specifications we interact proxies of
institutional quality with the liberalization dummy variables, and introduce the interaction term
as a separate variable in the regression. We experiment with six alternative measures of
institutional quality, GDP-per-capita and five indexes measuring the degree to which the rule
of law is respected ("law and order"), the extent of bureaucratic delays, the quality of contract
enforcement, the quality of the bureaucracy, and the degree of corruption. These indexes are
increasing in the quality of the institutions.
4. Empirical Results
Table 2 contains the results of the logit regressions estimating the probability of a
banking crisis as a function of the financial liberalization dummy variable and of a set of
control variables.  The table also presents the usual diagnostic tests to assess the goodness of
fit of the model. 1"  The columns correspond to different definitions of the financial
liberalization dummy: in the first column, which is the baseline specification, the dummny  is
zero for periods in which interest rates are subject to controls, and one when liberalization
"  The model X 2 tests the joint significance of the regressors by comparing the likelihood of
the model with that of a model with the intercept only. The AIC criterion is computed as
minus the log--likelihood  of the model plus the number of parameters being estimated, and it is
therefore smaller for better models. This criterion is useful in comparing models with different
degrees of freedom. The percentage of crises that are correctly classified and the total
percentage of observations that are correctly classified are reported to assess the prediction
accuracy of the model. A crisis is deemed to be accurately predicted when the estimated
probability exceeds the frequency of crisis observations in the sample (around 5 percent). This
criterion tends to downplay the performance of the model, because in a number of episodes
the estimated probability of a crisis increases significantly  a few years before the episode
begins and those observations are considered as incorrectly classified by the criterion (see
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997, for some examples).17
begins. The dummy remains one even if the liberalization is temporarily reversed under the
assumption that the effects of liberalization persist even through short reversals. In the second
column, the dummy variable is modified by treating periods of reversal as zeroes.
The baseline specifications fits the data well, and it classifies correctly 77 percent of
the observations. The macroeconomic control variables are all significant at least at the 5
percent level, and have the expected signs: banking crises tend to be associated with low GDP
growth, adverse terms of trade changes, high real interest rates, and high inflation. Of the
characteristics of the banking sector, vulnerability to a speculative attack against the currency
is significant at the 1 percent level, while credit growth lagged by two periods is significant at
the 10 percent level. The other variables are not significant.  Finally, GDP per capita is
significantly  negatively correlated to the probability of a banking crisis, suggesting that, other
things being equal, developing countries are more vulnerable.
More interestingly, the financial liberalization dummy variable is strongly positively
correlated with the probability of a banking crisis; as evident from column two, this is true
regardless of the treatment of reversals. These results suggest that financial liberalization is a
significant  factor leading to banking sector fragility; furthermore, this effect is at work even
after controlling for variables capturing the state of the macroeconomy (including the level of
the risk-free short-term real interest rate). This suggests that, even if it is carried out after
macroeconomic stabilization is achieved as recommended by McKinnon (1993), financial
liberalization still increases financial fragility.
An important question is whether the effect of liberalization on the probability of a
crisis tends to be a transitional effect, that is to manifest itself only during the years
immediately following the change in policy. To test this hypothesis, in columns 3 to 6 of Table18
2 we presents  estimates  of the baseline  regression  using  a liberalization  dummy  that takes the
value of one only in the first 3, 4, 5, and 6 years after  liberalization,  as opposed  to the entire
period following  the policy  change.  The redefined  dummies  are all less  significant  than  the
baseline  one, and the overall  goodness  of fit of the model  does not improve.  In fact, the
dummy  corresponding  to a transition  of only 3 years  is not significant,  and that corresponding
to a transition  of 4 years  is significant  only at the 10 percent  confidence  level.  Thus,  the effect
of financial  liberalization  on banking  fragility  does not appear  to be characteristic  of the
immediate  aftermath  of the change  in policy,  but rather it manifests  itself  only over time.  This
result  may also  be due to the fact that in a number  of countries  interest  rate deregulation  was
gradual,  and we chose  the beginning  of deregulation  as the date of the policy  change.
Another  interesting  question  is whether  the effects  of financial  liberalization  on
financial  fragility  dliffer  in countries  that were severely  repressed  at the time of liberalization
relative  to countries  that were only  financially  restrained.  To explore  this issue, we interact  the
financial  liberalization  dummy  variable  with a the average  real interest  rate in the three years
prior to liberalization,  and introduce  this interaction  term as an additional  regressor.  A
negative  and significant  coefficient  for the new variable  would  suggest  that fragility  is less
severely  affected  by liberalization  in countries  that were more financially  repressed  at the
beginning  of liberalization.  As shown  in column  seven  of Table  2, the estimated  coefficient  is
negative  but it is not significantly  different  from zero.
Table  3 provides  an illustration  of the magnitude  of the effect  of financial  liberalization
on financial  fragilily  according  to our empirical  model: the third column  contains  the
probability  of a crisis  as estimated  by the baseline  model  for the 26 crisis  episodes  that took
place  in a liberalized  regime.  For those episodes,  the probability  of a crisis  is then  recalculated19
after setting the liberalization dummy equal to zero (column 4, Table 3). As it is apparent, for
all countries the predicted crisis probability falls substantially,  and of the 20 episodes that were
correctly classified as crises 11 would have switched to non-crisis status in the absence of
financial liberalization. Thus, the effect of financial liberalization on the probability of a
banking crisis not only is statistically significant, but it is also of a non-trivial magnitude.
The Role of the Institutional Environment
The theory reviewed in Section 2 suggests that the adverse effect of financial
liberalization on banking sector fragility is stronger where the institutions needed for the
correct functioning of financial markets are not well-established. To test whether this effect is
supported by the data, in Table 4 we add to the baseline regression various alternative
variables in the form of interaction terms between the liberalization dummy and proxies of the
quality of the institutional environment.  Negative and significant  coefficients for the
interaction variables mean that a better institutional environment tends to weaken the effect of
financial liberalization on the probability of a banking crisis.
The first proxy for the institutional environment is GDP per-capita, which was also
used as a control variable in the baseline regression. The other five proxies are indexes of the
degree to which the rule of law is respected ("law and order"), of bureaucratic delay, of the
quality of contract enforcement, of the quality of the bureaucracy, and of the degree of
corruption." 2 All six interaction variables have the expected negative sign, and all except the
12 The indexes measuring "law and order", the quality of the bureaucracy, and corruption
range between 0 and 6, while the index of bureaucratic delay and that of contract enforcement
range from 0 to 4.20
index of bureaucratic delay are significant  at least at the 10 percent confidence level. The
degree of law enforcement, GDP per capita, and corruption have the highest significance
levels. Furthermore, the size of the effect is not trivial: for instance, consider the "law and
order index". For a country with a score of zero (the lowest score), the net impact of financial
liberalization on the crisis probability is 1.770, while for a country with an intermediate score
of three the net impact falls to 0.555, and for a country with the maximum score of six the net
impact becomes negative, namely financial liberalization tends to make banking crises less
likely. Similarly,  moving from the worst quality of contract enforcement to the best (a change
in the index from zero to four) reduces the impact of liberalization on the crisis probability
from 4.732 to 0.980.
These results suggest that improving the quality of the institutional environment,
especially reducing the amount of corruption and strengthening the rule of law, can curb the
tendency of liberalized  financial markets to harbor systemic banking crises." 3
5. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we report a number of robustness tests performed on the baseline
regression. The first test concerns the treatment of years during which the crisis is under way.
Those years are omitted from the baseline specification, an approach that requires accurate
information on the year in which a crisis ended. Since the end of a crisis may be difficult  to
determine in practice, we also estimate the baseline regression using three alternative panels:
13 It is worth noticing that the proxies do not measure the quality of the laws and regulations
in a particular country, but rather factors that affect the extent to which laws and regulations
are enforced.21
one that omits all years following a crisis, one that treats all crisis years as ones, and one that
treats all crisis years (except the first) as zeroes. The results, reported in Table 5, show that,
while there are some changes in the coefficients and standard errors of the control variables,
the liberalization dummy remains strongly significant  in all specifications.
A second set of sensitivity tests (Table 6) uses a more stringent definition of a banking
crisis relative to the baseline (ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of at least 15
percent and/or a cost of crisis of at least 3 percent of GDP) as well as a looser definition of
crisis (ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of at least 5 percent, and/or cost of the
crisis of at least 1 percent of GDP). Nothing much changes concerning the control variables,
and the liberalization dummy remains significant, albeit only at the 10 percent confidence
level.
A third methodological issue, which always arises in panel estimation, is whether to
include country (time) fixed effects to allow for the possibility that the dependent variable may
vary across countries (years) independently of the explanatory variables included in the
regression. In logit estimation, including fixed effects requires excluding from the panel
countries (years) in which there was no crisis during the period under consideration (Greene,
1997, p. 899), and hence it excludes a large amount of information. For this reason, we omit
fixed effects from the baseline, and estimate a model with fixed effects as part of the sensitivity
analysis (Table 7, columns 2 and 3).  In the case of both country and time fixed effects, the
hypothesis that the coefficients of the country and time dummies are jointly significantly
different from zero is rejected, suggesting that there are no fixed effects. In any case, the
liberalization dummy is still positively and significantly  correlated with the probability of a
crisis.22
Another sensitivity test involves using lagged values of the explanatory variables to
reduce the risk that the regressors may not be exogenous determinants of a crisis (Table 7,
column 2). The drawback of using lagged values on the right-hand side, of course, is that if
the macroeconomic shocks that trigger the crisis work relatively quickly, then their effect
would not be evident a year before the crisis erupts. In this regression, most macroeconomic
control variables loose significance  (except for the real interest rate), while the other controls
remain significant; more interestingly, the liberalization dummy continues to be positively and
significantly  correlated to the probability of a crisis.
To sumrnarize, the relationship between financial liberalization and banking sector
fragility appears to be robust to various changes in the specification of the logit regression.
6.  Financial Liiberalization  and Bank Franchise Values
The results of the previous sections suggest that liberalization increases the fragility of
the financial system. One reason why financial liberalization may lead to increased banking
sector fragility is that the removal of interest rate ceilings and/or the reduction of barriers to
entry reduces bank franchise values, thus exacerbating moral hazard problems. As discussed
in Caprio and Summers (1993) and Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (1994), interest rate
ceilings and entry restrictions create rents that make a banking license more valuable to the
holder.  It is the risk of losing this valuable license which induces banks to become more stable
institutions, with better incentives  to monitor the firms they finance and manage the risk of
their loan portfolio.  Thus, when a reform -- such as financial  liberalization -- leads to
increased bank competition and lower profits, this erodes franchise values, distorting the risk-
taking incentives of the institutions. Unless the reform effort incorporates adequate23
strengthening of the prudential regulations and supervision to realign incentives, lower
franchise values are likely to lead to increased fragility." 4
In this section we use bank level data from the BankScope data base of IBCA to
investigate whether there is any empirical evidence that bank franchise values fall with
financial liberalization. The data set includes bank-level accounting data for 80 countries over
the 1988-1995 period. In most countries, the banks covered in the IBCA survey account for at
least 90 percent of the banking system.  For each bank we construct three profitability
measures:  net interest margin, after tax-return on assets, and after-tax return on equity. Since
none of these measures is a perfect indicator of future profitability, we also look at additional
balance sheet ratios which may be associated with a fall in franchise value: a measure of
capital adequacy (the book value of equity divided by total assets); a measure of liquidity (the
ratio of liquid assets to total assets); and the share of deposits to total liabilities.  These ratios
are country averages of bank level figures. Both high capitalization and high liquidity should
have an adverse effect on bank franchise value, since they decrease the amount of loans that a
bank can extend for any given amount of deposits." Also, we examine the behavior of an
indicator of market concentration (the ratio of assets of the largest three banks to total
banking assets) and an indicator of foreign bank penetration (the proportion of foreign bank
assets in total bank assets). More market concentration and less foreign bank penetration
14 Keeley (1990) presents empirical evidence that supports this view. First, he shows that in
the 1  970s U.S. thrift institutions began to lose charter value owing to the relaxation of
various regulatory entry restrictions and because of technological changes. Second, he shows
that banks with larger charter value were less risky, as measured by the risk-premium on
uninsured bank CDs.
15 Of course, for given franchise value, large capitalization and large liquidity should create
less incentives to take on risk.24
should  be associated  with more  monopolistic  powers  for domestic  banks,  and, therefore,  with
higher  franchise  values.
Table  8 reports the correlations  of these  banking  variables  with the financial
liberalization  dummy  variable.  Of course, simple  correlations  do not imply  causality.  However,
this exercise  can at least tell  us whether  the hypothesis  that financial  liberalization  leads  to
lower bank franchise  values  can be dismissed  out-of-hand  or needs  to be taken seriously.  The
correlations  in the first column  of the table are calculated  using a dummy  variable  that is equal
to one in all periods  in which  the financial  market  is liberalized,  and zero otherwise;  in the
remaining  colunns, the liberalization  dummy  is redefined  to take a value of one during  the
transition  to a liberalized  system  (where  the transition  is taken to last three, four, five,  or six
years alternatively),  and zero otherwise.  Thus,  by comparing  these sets of correlations  we can
see to what extent the fall in bank franchise  value  (if there is one) is a temporary  or permanent
effect  of liberalization.
The results in the first column indicate that liberalization leads to permanently lower
bank profits  measured  as return on equity,  while  neither  the net interest margin  nor the return
on assets are significantly  correlated  with the liberalization  dummy.  There is also evidence  that
financial liberalization leads to higher capitalization (which should reduce bank profitability),
and lower liquidity (which should have the opposite effect). The extent of deposit mobilization
in the long run cloes  not appear to change significantly  with liberalization. More interestingly,
liberalization appears to be permanently associated with a lower bank concentration ratio
(albeit significant  only at the 13 percent confidence level) and a greater presence of foreign
banks.  Both of these effects  are consistent  with lower  bank franchise  values due to reduced
monopolistic profits resulting from greater competition.25
When we look at the correlations with the transition to a liberalized system, we see
that bank margins, profits, capital, liquidity, and deposit mobilization are all higher during the
transition period. However, a comparison with the correlations in the first column suggest that
most of these effect do not survive in the long-run. During the transition, we do not see a
significant coefficient for bank concentration or foreign bank penetration, suggesting that the
structure of the banking sector changes only slowly after the liberalization process begins.
Despite the cursory nature of the analysis,  these results are broadly consistent with the
theories that conjecture that liberalization would lead to increased bank fragility due to its
negative impact on bank franchise values. The next logical step would be to test whether low
bank franchise values are associated to increased bank fragility; unfortunately, we are unable
to examine this issue because the number of banking crises that take place during the period
covered by the BankScope data set is too small.
7.  Financial Liberalization, Banking Crises, Financial Development, and Growth
So far, we have established that financial liberalization has a cost in terms of increased
financial fragility. Do these results imply that policy-makers should abandon liberalization in
favor of increased direct intervention in financial markets? Of course, the answer depends on
whether the welfare costs of financial fragility exceed the welfare benefits of liberalization, and
on whether governments can be expected to design and implement regulations that correct
market failures rather than reinforce them. An answer to these complex questions is well
beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it is possible to use our data set to explore one
aspect of this issue, namely whether financial liberalization and banking crises affect economic
growth through their effect on financial development.26
The focus on growth  effects  through  financial  development  is suggested  by the large
existing  literature  documenting  how financial  development  increases  long-run  growth  rates
(King and Levine,  1993,  Levine,  1997):  presumably,  one of the main  benefits  of financial
liberalization  is that it fosters  financial  development  and, through  it, increases  long-run
growth. Conversely,  the disruption  caused  by a systemic  banking  crisis  is likely  to have a
direct  adverse  effect  on financial  development  (at least in the short or medium  term) and,
through  that avenue,  have a negative  impact  on growth. The question  addressed  in this section
is whether  these effects  can be detected  in our data set, and, if so, how the magnitude  of the
adverse  effect  of banking  crises  on financial  development  compares  with that of the positive
effect  of financial  liberalization.
To verify  whether  financial  development  tends to increase  growth in our sample,  we
estimate  growth  regression  using a panel  obtained  by splitting  the sample  period (1980-94)  in
three subperiods  of five  years each. The regressors  include  a set of control  variables  and four
alternative  indicators  of financial  development  proposed  by King  and Levine  (1993).16  These
indicators  are the ratio of liquid  liabilities  of the financial  system  to GDP (liquidity),  the share
of bank credit  that goes to the private sector (private  credit),  the ratio of domestic  bank assets
to the sum  of cenitral  bank assets and domestic  bank assets  (bank assets),  and the ratio of
central  bank domestic  assets to GDP (central  bank). The first three indicators  are increasing
with financial  development,  while  the fourth is decreasing.  The results  of the growth
16 The control  variables,  also similar  to those  used by King and Levine  (1993), are the
logarithm  of GDP per-capita  and of the secondary  school  enrollment  ratio at the beginning  of
the subperiod,  the share  of government  consumption  expenditure  in GDP, the inflation  rate,
the ratio of the sum of imports  and exports  to GDP,  the real  interest rate, and a period dummy
variable.27
regressions are reported in the top panel of Table 9: although the R2 are generally quite low,
two out of four indicators have significant  coefficients of the expected sign (bank assets and
central bank). Thus, there is some evidence that financial development is positively correlated
with growth in our panel.
To assess the impact of financial liberalization and banking crises on financial
development, we then regress each financial development indicator on a constant, the
liberalization dummy, and the banking crisis dummy, using the same panel as in the growth
regressions." 7 The estimated coefficients have a simple interpretation: the constant is the mean
level of financial development for observations with neither financial liberalization nor a
banking crisis. The coefficient of the liberalization dummy, on the other hand, indicates the
difference between the level of financial development in a country/time period with financial
liberalization but no banking crisis and the level of financial development in countries/time
periods with neither liberalization nor a banking crisis. Similarly,  the coefficient of the banking
crisis dummy, if significantly  less than zero, would indicate that, on average, observations
corresponding to banking crises are accompanied by lower financial development, conditional
on no liberalization having occurred. Finally, if the difference between the coefficients of the
two dummies is significantly  greater than zero, then a country/period with both financial
17  The financial liberalization dummy variable takes the value of one if interest rate
liberalization began in any of the years of the subperiod or if markets were liberalized in the
preceding subperiod; the banking crisis dummy variable takes the value of one if a crisis was
on-going in any of the years of the subperiod. The results are robust to redefining the dummy
variables by treating a subperiod as a one only if the change in policy (crisis) occurs in the first
three years of the subperiod. If the change in policy (crisis) takes place in the last or second-
to-last period, then the dummy for the following  period is set to one.28
liberalization and a banking crisis has, on average, a higher level of financial development than
one with no crisis and controlled financial markets.
Table 9 contains estimation results. The coefficient of the liberalization dummy is
positive and significant in all the specifications, while the banking crisis dummy has a negative
coefficient which is significant  in all specifications except one. Thus, both financial
liberalization and the occurrence of banking crises appear to significantly  affect financial
development. Turning now to the difference between the two coefficients, it appears that
countries/ periods with both banking crises and financial liberalization have greater financial
development but only if financial development is measured by private credit or by bank assets.
For liquidity and central bank, the difference in the coefficients is not significantly  different
from zero.  Private credit, however, does not have a significant  impact on growth in our panel,
as shown in the first row of Table 9. Only in one regression, the one using bank assets as an
indicator of financial development, are both the net effect of the dummies on financial
development and the effect of financial  development on growth significant.  Thus, these tests
do not show clear evidence that choosing financial liberalization at the cost of experiencing a
banking crisis pays off in terms of higher growth through higher financial development, or vice
versa, at least in a medium term time frame.  18
Additional insights on this issue can be obtained by splitting the sample between
countries that were repressed at the time of financial liberalization and countries that were
only restrained. Countries are classified as repressed if they had a negative interest rate (on
18  When we estimate a growth regression including the banking crisis dummy and the financial
liberalization durmmy,  however, the coefficients are not significant,  suggesting that the
dummies have a negligible direct impact on growth.29
average) during the three years preceding financial liberalization, and they are classified as
restrained if they liberalized  from a position of positive interest rates." 9 Countries that
maintained controlled financial markets during the entire sample period are omitted from this
panel, since they cannot be classified in either group. 20 When the sample is split in this fashion,
for the restrained countries the results are quite similar to those for the sample as a whole
(bank assets and central bank are significant),  while for the repressed group, also private
credit is significant (Tables 10 and 11).
More interestingly, when we regress the financial development indicators on the
liberalization dummy and on the crisis dummy, banking crises do not seem to lead to
significantly lower financial development in repressed countries (where financial development
is in any case lower than in the restrained group), while they do so in restrained countries, at
least in two out of four regressions (Tables 10 and 11). In contrast, the positive impact of
financial liberalization is present in both groups of countries. Thus, based on these estimated
coefficients, a country that liberalized from a position of financial restraint and experienced a
banking crisis has a level of financial development similar to a country that did not liberalize
and escaped banking sector problems. In contrast, for countries that liberalized from a
position of financial  repression, the level of financial development is higher with liberalization
even if the country experiences a banking crisis. Based on the coefficient estimated in the
19  Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) find the negative growth effects of financial repression to
be stronger in financially repressed countries than in financially  restrained countries.
20 The panel includes countries that liberalized well before the beginning of the sample period.
It may be argued that whether those countries were financially repressed or restrained at the
time of liberalization should not affect their economic performance in 1980-94. As a
robustness test, we repeated the tests described below dropping those countries from the
panel. The basic results remain unchanged.30
growth regression, the net positive effect on growth for this group of countries is of the order
of 7/10 to 9/10 of a percentage point per-year (Table 11).
To summarize, this section has shown some empirical evidence supporting the
hypothesis that financial liberalization is associated with higher financial development and,
through it, with higher output growth, while banking crises have the opposite effects. For
countries that liberalize from a position of financial restraint, the gains from liberalization in
terms of financial development are comparable to the costs of having a banking crisis, while in
the case of financially repressed countries the gains from financial liberalization are larger.
Although these results are suggestive, it is important to stress that they are tentative,
and that the methodology used in deriving them leaves a lot to be desired: first, growth
regressions are intended to study the determinants of long-run growth rates, which are usually
taken to be averages of many years of data. To have enough data points, here we are forced to
use five-year averages, which may not really capture the long-run rate of economic growth. In
fact, the low R 2 in the growth regressions may indicate that cyclical and other factors not
controlled for are important in explaining  the dependent variable. If there are omitted
variables, and these variables are correlated with the development indicators, the estimates of
the coefficient of the financial development indicator would be biased. This criticism,
however, concerns only the growth regressions, where the linkage between financial
development and growth is established for our panel. Since this linkage has already been
documented in other, more rigorous studies, we are not excessively worried by this
shortcoming.
The more interesting part of the exercise is the test of the relationship between
financial development, financial liberalization, and banking crises. Here our tests, besides31
being confined to a short and medium-term horizon, are limited because they are basically
differences of means, and ignore that factors other than liberalization and banking crises affect
financial development. Also, the effect of financial liberalization on the probability of a
banking crisis is not explicitly incorporated in the analysis. We leave more sophisticated
explorations of this important issue to future research.
8.  Concluding Remarks
Increased liberalization of financial  markets in general and of the banking sector in
particular have been major items in the economic policy agenda of many countries during the
last 30 years. In this time period, the frequency of systemic banking problems has increased
markedly all over the world, raising the issue of whether greater fragility may be a
consequence of liberalization. In this paper we have attempted to shed light on the issue by
studying a large panel data set, covering 53 developed and developing economies during the
period 1980-95. The panel includes countries that liberalized  their financial markets several
years before 1980, and others that liberalized at different dates over the sample period; also,
countries that experienced one or more banking crises are represented along with countries
that had a stable banking system throughout the period. Thus, the data set covers a large
variety of experiences, from which it would be impossible to draw lessons without the help of
econometric techniques.
The first result that emerges from the analysis  is that financial fragility is affected by a
multiplicity of factors, including adverse macroeconomic developments, bad macroeconomic
policies, and vulnerability  to balance-of-payments crises. When these factors are controlled
for, financial liberalization exerts an independent negative effect on the stability of the banking32
sector, and the magnitude of the effect is not trivial. However, a strong institutional
environment, characterized by effective law enforcement, an efficient  bureaucracy, and little
corruption, can curb the adverse effects of liberalization on the financial system.
These findings suggests that institutional development needs to be emphasized early in
the liberalization process; in countries where the institutional environment is weak, achieving
macroeconomic stabilization before or during liberalization would certainly bring an important
independent source of financial instability under control. However, even in an otherwise well-
functioning economy weaknesses in the institutions and in the regulatory framework necessary
for financial markets to operate efficiently  may fail to check perverse behavior on the part of
financial intermediaries, creating the foundations for systemic financial sector problems.
Unfortunately, strong institutions cannot be created overnight, not even by the most reform-
oriented government; thus, the path to financial liberalization should be a gradual one, in
which the benefits of each further step towards liberalization are carefully weighed against the
risks. Another implication of our findings is that more research effort should be focussed on
the design and implementation of prudential regulations and supervision especially in
developing countries.
Support for a gradual approach towards financial liberalization also comes from our
findings about the effects of liberalization and fragility on financial development and, through
it, on growth: while for countries that were initially  in a state of financial repression the
positive effect of liberalization on financial development appears to be stronger than the
negative effect of a banking crisis, this is not the case for countries that liberalized from a
situation of financial restraint, where the two effects roughly offset each other. One way of
reading these findings is that, once financial sector reforms are carried out to secure positive33
interest  rates, steps  towards further  liberalization  may  not necessary  yields  gains  that offset  the
negative  impact  of increased  fragility.34
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Table 1
Interest Rate Liberalization and Banking Crisis Dates








Chile  1980-95  1981-87
Colombia  1980-95  1982-85
Denrmark  1981-95
Ecuador  1986-87, 1992-95
Egypt  1991-95





Guyana,  1991-95  1993-95
Honduras  1990-95
Indonesia  1983-95  1992-94
India  1991-95  1991-94
Ireland  1985-95
Israel  1990-95  1983-84
Italy  1980-95  1990-94
Jamaica  1991-95
Jordan  1988-95  1989-90
Japan  1985-95  1992-94
Kenya  1991-95  199337
Korea  1984-88, 1991-95
Sri Lanka  1980-95  1989-93
Mexico  1989-95  1982, 1994-95
Malaysia  1980-95  1985-88
Mali  1987-89
Nigeria  1990-93  1991-95
Netherlands  1980-95
Norway  1985-1995  1987-93
New Zealand  1980,1984-95
Papua New Guinea  1980-95  1989-95
Peru  1980-84, 1990-95  1983-90
Philippines  1981-95  1981-87
Portugal  1984-95  1986-89
Paraguay  1990-95  1995
El Salvador  1991-95  1989
Tanzania  1993-95  1988-95
Syria
Sweden  1980-95  1990-93
Togo  1993-95
Thailand  1989- 95  1983-87
Turkey*  1980-82, 1984-95  1991, 1994-95
Uganda*  1991-95
Uruguay  1980-95  1981-85
US  1980-95  1980-92
Venezuela  1989-95  1993-95
Zaire*  1980-95
Zambia*  1992-95
*  This country had additional  banking crises during 1980-95, but these crises are not included in the panel because
of missing data.38
Table 2. Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Control Variables:
GROWTH  -.168***  -.164***  -.163***  -.162***  -.167***  -.168***  -.191***
(.040)  (.039)  (.039)  (.039)  (.039)  (.039)  (.044)
TOTCHANGE  -.052**  -.050**  -.043**  -.043**  -.049**  -.049**  -.050**
(.023)  (.022)  (.020)  (.020)  (.022)  (.022)  (.025)
REAL INTEREST  .047***  .046***  .048***  .050***  .051***  .050*$*  .044***
(.015)  (.015)  (.015)  (.015)  (.015)  (.015)  (.015)
INFLATION  .027***  .027***  .027***  .027***  .027***  .028***  .022**
(.009)  (.008)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.011)
M2/RESERVES  .022***  .021***  .016***  .017***  .017***  .017**  .024***
(.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)
PRIVATE/GDP  .007  .007  .006  .006  .006  .006  .013
(.012)  (.013)  (.012)  (.012)  (.012)  (.012)  (.013)
CASH/BANK  -.018  -.019  -.020  -.020  -.021  -.020  -.022
(.014)  (.014)  (.014)  (.014)  (.014)  (.014)  (.016)
CREDIT GROt2 .023*  .022*  .023 *  .023*  .023*  .023*  .013
(.013)  (.013)  (.013)  (.013)  (.013)  (.013)  (.014)
GDP/CAP  -.108**  -.103**  -.078*  -.077*  -.079*  -.080*  -.101*
(.051)  (.051)  (.051)  (.051)  (.051)  (.051)  (.057)
Financial Liberalization:
FIN. LIB.  1.761***  1.449**
(.634)  (.712)
FIN. LIB (R)  1.423***
(.589)
FIN. LIB. (3)  .488
(A34)
FIN.  LI.  (4)  .639*
(.415)
FIN.  LIB. (5)  .892**
(.415)
FIN. LIB. (6)  .811**
(.418)
FIN.  LIB. x INITIAL  -. 026
INT.  (.020)
Past Crisis:
DURATIONof  .108**  .115**  .139***  .147***  .139***  .140***  .130**
last period  (.051)  (.051)  (.051)  (.050)  (.050)  (.051)  (.062)
No. of Crisis  32  32  31  32  32  32  26
No. of Obs.  639  639  602  639  632  632  525
% correct  77  77  77  76  76  77  78
% crisis correct  63  63  68  59  59  56  62
model X 2 61.42***  58.79***  52.52***  54.49***  57.32***  56.48***  55.95***
AIC  217  219  218  224  219  221  177
*,  **and *** indicate significance  levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.39
Table 3.  Impact of Interest Liberalization on Crisis Probability
Countryt  Bank  Crisis  Probability  of Crisis  Predicted  Probability  of Crisis  had the
Start  Date  Predicted  by Baseline  at  Country  not Liberalized  on or prior to
Crisis  Datel  the Bank  Crisis  Date
Chile  1981  .174  .035
Colombia  1982  .047  .008
Finland  1991  .119  .023
Guyana  1993  .028  .005
India  1991  .221  .047
Indonesia  1992  .306  .071
Italy  1990  .028  .005
Japan  1992  .071  .012
Jordan  1989  .786  .387
Kenya  1993  .412  .108
Malaysia  1985  .170  .034
Mexico  1994  .207  .043
Nigeria  1991  .044  .008
Norway  1987  .031  .006
Papua  N.Guinea  1989  .259  .057
Paraguay  1995  .114  .022
Peru  1983  .347  .084
Philippines  1981  .052  .009
Portugal  1986  .133  .026
Sri Lanka  1989  .104  .019
Sweden  1990  .033  .006
Turkey  1991  .221  .047
1994  .443  .121
Uruguay  1981  .358  .087
United  States  1980  .459  .126
Venezuela  1993  .424  .113
t Probabilities  for Mali,  Mexico  1982,  El Salvador,  Israel,Tanzania,  and Thailand  are  not reported
since  these  countries  had not liberalized  prior  to the banking  crisis.
: Countries  in the  baseline  specification  are classified  as crisis cases  if the  predicted  probability  is
greater  than .05,  which  is equal  to the  ratio of number  of crisis observations  to total number  of
observations.40
Table  4. Financial  Liberalization  and Banking  Crises  -- Institutional  Environment
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Control Variables:
GROWTH  -.171***  -.214***  -.233***  -.238***  -.219***  -.223***
(.040)  (.054)  (.072)  (.070)  (.054)  (.054)
TOT CHANGE  -.054**  -.040*  -.056*  -.060*  -.042*  -.040*
(.023)  (.027)  (.034)  (.033)  (.026)  (.026)
REAL INTEREST  .045***  .052**  .053**  .050***  .049**  .049**
(.015)  (.024)  (.021)  (.021)  (.024)  (.023)
INFLATION  .026***  .024*  .022*  .020*  .021  .022
(.009)  (.015)  (.013)  (.013)  (.015)  (.015)
M2/RESERVES  .022***  .018*  .025**  .025* *  .022**  .019**
(.007)  (.010)  (.012)  (.012)  (.010)  (.010)
PRIVATE/GDP  .002  -.003  .005  .006  -.003  -.003
(.011)  (.011)  (.012)  (.012)  (.011)  (.011)
CASH/BANK  -.018  -.030  .020  .015  -.030  -.027
(.014)  (.023)  (.026)  (.026)  (.022)  (.021)
CREDIT GROt-,  .024*  .013  .045***  .043***  .011  .009
(.013)  (.018)  (.017)  (.016)  (.018)  (.018)
Financial Liberalization and Institutions:
FIN. LIB.  1.956***  1.770*  4.053***  4.732***  1.803*  1.823*
(.657)  (.986)  (1.542)  (1.557)  (1.082)  (1.030)
FIN. LIB. x  -.089*(6')
GDP/CAP  (.048)
FIN. LIB. x LAW &  -.405**
ORDER  (.205)
FIN. LIB. x DELAY  -.727
(.678)
FIN. LIB. x CONT.  -.938*
ENFORCEMENT  (.574)
FIN. LIB. x BUR.  -.380*
QUALITY  (.223)
FIN. LIB. x  403*(6/)
CORRUPTION  (.2  15)
Past Crisis:
DURATION of  .112**  .181**  .028  .031  .171**  .156**
last period  (.051)  (.081)  (.067)  (.067)  (.079)  (.078)
No. of Crisis  32  22  21  21  22  22
No. of Obs.  639  425  406  406  418  418
% correct  77  72  78  80  72  73
% crisis correct  63  55  67  71  59  59
model X 2 60.08***  35.69***  49.65***  51.34***  34.16***  34.77***
AIC  218  161  140  138  162  162
*, **and  *  indicate  significance  levels  of  10, 5 and 1 percent  respectively.41
Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis: Different Treatment of Crisis Years
Baseline  No years after  Years of  Years of
first crisis  crisis=l  crisis=0
Control Variables:
GROWTH  -.168***  -.136***  -.067***  -.137***
(.040)  (.041)  (.023)  (.036)
TOTCHANGE  -.052**  -.043**  -.014  -.047**
(.023)  (.023)  (.014)  (.021)
RL. INTEREST  .047***  .046***  .016***  .013**
(.015)  (.017)  (.007)  (.006)
INFLATION  .027***  .025***  .016***  .004
(.009)  (.010)  (.005)  (.005)
M2/RESERVES  .022***  .017***  .017***  .008*
(.007)  (.007)  (.004)  (.005)
PRIVATE/GDP  .007  .015  .011**  -.003
(.012)  (.012)  (.005)  (.009)
CASH/BANK  -.018  -.007  -.016**  -.005
(.014)  (.014)  (.008)  (.012)
CREDIT GRO,2 .023*  .018  .002  .019*
(.013)  (.014)  (.008)  (.012)
GDP/CAP  -.108**  -.134***  -.091***  -.080**
(.051)  (.052)  (.022)  (.041)
Financial Liberalization:
FIN. LIB.  1.761***  2.154***  2.187***  1.178**
(.634)  (.618)  (.343)  (.557)
Past Crisis:
DURATION of  .108**  -.133***  .144***
lastperiod  (.051)  (.030)  (.049)
No. of Crisis  32  29  128  32
No. of Obs.  639  531  735  735
% correct  77  77  72  73
% crisis correct  63  66  69  59
model X 2 61.42***  50.50***  141.82***  42.67***
AIC  217  197  562  245
*, **and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.42
Table  6.  Sensitivity  Analysis:  Different  Crisis  Definitions
Baseline  More Stringent  Less Stringent  Definition
Definition
Control Variables:
GROWTH  -.168***  -.126***  -.160***
(.040)  (.044)  (.039)
TOT CHANGE  -.052**  -.054**  -.045**
(.023)  (.023)  (.022)
RL. INTEREST  .047***  .067***  .044***
(.015)  (.023)  (.014)
INFLATION  .027***  .032***  .025***
(.009)  (.012)  (.009)
M2/RESERVES  .022***  .009  .020***
(.007)  (.007)  (.007)
PRIVATE/GDP  .007  .003  .001
(.012)  (.017)  (.011)
CASH/BANK  -.018  -.017  -.021
(.014)  (.018)  (.015)
CREDIT GRO,2 .023*  .022  .027**
(.013)  (.015)  (.013)
GDP/CAP  -.108**  -.150**  -.069*
(.051)  (.071)  (.044)
Financial Liberalization:
FIN. LIB.  1.761***  1.098*  1.732***
(.634)  (.692)  (.607)
Past Crisis:
DURATION of  .108**  .106*  .109**
last period  (.051)  (.059)  (.047)
No. of Crisis  32  24  36
No. of Obs.  639  639  623
% correct  77  78  74
% crisis correct  63  58  61
model x2  61.42***  52.88***  59.73***
AIC  217  176  239
*, **and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.43
Table  7. Sensitivity  Analysis:  Country  and Time  Fixed  Effects,  and Lagged  Explanatory  Variables'




GROWTH  -. 168***  -.246***  -.177***  .057
(.040)  (.060)  (.047)  (.044)
TOT CHANGE  -.052**  -.054*  -.044*  -.004
(.023)  (.031)  (.026)  (.022)
RL. INTEREST  .047***  .122***  .049***  .007*
(.015)  (.042)  (.015)  (.004)
INFLATION  .027***  .064***  .028***  .004
(.009)  (.027)  (.009)  (.003)
M2/RESERVES  .022***  .026**  .024***  .007**
(.007)  (.012)  (.007)  (.003)
PRIVATE/GDP  .007  -.011  .012  -.001
(.012)  (.039)  (.014)  (.012)
CASH/BANK  -.018  .002  -.016  -.002
(.014)  (.024)  (.015)  (.009)
CREDIT GRO . 2 .023*  .032*  .024*  .019*
(.013)  (.021)  (.014)  (.012)
GDP/CAP  -.108**  -.402  -.138***  -.077*
(.051)  (.423)  (.056)  (.046)
Financial Liberalization:
FIN. LIB.  1.761***  1.962*  2.077***  1.113**
(.634)  (1.196)  (.702)  (.555)
Past Crisis:
DURATION of  .108**  .501  .229**  .073
last period  (.051)  (.132)  (.113)  (.049)
No. of Crisis  32  32  32  31
No. of Obs.  639  333  565  605
% correct  77  75  76  67
% crisis correct  63  44  53  58
model X 2 61.42***  81.85***  66.39***  22.44***
AIC  217  210  235  246
*,  "and  *** indicate significance  levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
1 The coefficients of the country and time dummy variables are not reported.44
Table 8. Correlation Coefficient between Financial  Liberalization and
Bank Franchise Value Indicators'
FIN.  L1B.  FIN.  LDB  (3)  FIN.  LDB  (4)  FIN.  LIB  (5)  FIN.  LIB  (6)
net interest  .024  .175***  .150***  .157***  .158***
margin  .653  .001  .006  .004  .004
return on assets  .088  .202***  .168***  .167***  .132**
.139  .001  .006  .006  .030
return on equity  -.118**  .120**  .097*  .077  .068
.028  .029  .076  .158  .212
capital  .20'7***  .058  .119**  .116**  .121**
.000  .289  .028  .032  .026
liquidity  -. 55***  .154***  .184***  .152***  .168***
.004  .005  .001  .005  .002
deposit share  -.033  .069  .161***  .170***  .121**
.541  .210  .003  .002  .026
market  -.087  .092  .053  .042  .035
concentration  .137  .121  .377  .476  .552
share of foreign  .109**  -.012  .015  .020  .031
banks  .06.2  .840  .799  .734  .606
t Pearson correlation  coefficients  are reported.  P-values  are given in italics.  *, **  and *** indicate
significance  levels  of  10, 5 and  1 percent  respectively.  Net  interest  margin  is given by interest  income
minus interest  expenses  divided by total  assets. Return  on assets  given by net profits  divided by total
assets.  Return  on equity is given by net profits  divided by book value  of equity.  Capital is the book value
of equity divided  by total assets.  Liquidity  is the ratio of liquid  assets to total assets.  Deposit  share is the
share  of deposits  (customer  and short term  funding)  in total  liabilities.  Market concentration  is measured
as the ratio  of assets  in the largest three banks  to total bank  assets. The share of foreign banks  is the ratio
of foreign bank  assets  to total bank  assets.  All bank  level variables  are average  ratios for all banks  in the
BankScope  data base in a country in a given year.45
Table  9. Growth,  Financial  Development,  Financial  Liberalization,  and Banking  Crises  -
Full Sample
Liquidity  Private  Bank  Central bank
credit  assets
Growth regressions'
financial development  -.407  .243  3.450**  -2.010*
(.765)  (1.007)  (1.633)  (1.166)
AdjustedR2 .11  .11  .14  .11
No of observation  136  136  137  134
Financial development regressions 2
constant  .466***  .252***  .682***  .187***
(.044)  (.032)  (.028)  (.048)
financial liberalization dummy  .108**  .202***  .152***  -.103**
(.050)  (.044)  (.034)  (.043)
banking crisis  -.104*  -.085*  -.066*  .040
dummy  (.055)  (.047)  (.037)  (.039)
Adjusted R 2 .03  .09  .10  .03
No. of observations  156  156  159  153
aggregate impact on financial  .004  .117**  .086*  -.063
development  F=.00  F=4.62  F=3.32  F=.88
coefficient  in growth regression  -.407  .243  3.450**  -2.010*
impact on growth  .002  .028  .297  .127
1 The dependent variable is the real per capita GDP growth rate. Each growth regression includes an alternative
financial development  indicator, as specified in the column header. Liquidity is ratio of liquid liabilities of the
financial sysytem  to GDP. Private credit is the ratio of bank credit to private sector to GDP. Bank assets is ratio of
deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money banks domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets.
Central bank is the ratio of central bank domestic assets to GDP. Besides the financial development  indicators, the
regressions include the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP, the logarithm of initial secondary school enrollment,
the ratio of government  consumption expenditure to GDP, inflation rate, ratio of exports plus imports to GDP,  the
real interest rate, dummy  variables for 5-year  periods.  White's heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors are
given in parantheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
2 The dependent variable is the financial development indicator  listed in the column header. Regressions include a
constant.46
Table 10. Growth, Financial Development, Financial Liberalization, and Banking Crises -
Financially  Restrained Countries
Liquidity  Private  Bank  Central
credit  assets  bank
Growth regressions'
financial development  -.735  -.775  12.418***  -13.417*
(.841)  (1.007)  (4.757)  (7.362)
Adjusted R2 .09  .09  .25  .13
No of observation  64  64  64  62
Financial development regressions2
constant  .518***  .363***  .788***  .094***
(.075)  (.059)  (.030)  (.012)
financial liberalization dummy  .157*  .173**  .112***  -.038***
(.084)  (.074)  (.033)  (.014)
banking crisis  -.019  -.082  -.074*  .038**
dummy  (.111)  (.082)  (.040)  (.019)
Adjusted R 2 .01  .04  .14  .10
No. of observations  72  72  72  69
aggregate impact on financial  .138  .091  .038  .000
development  F=.86  F=.75  F=.51  F=.00
coefficient  in growth regression  -.735  -.775  12.418***  -13.417*
impact on growth  -.101  -.071  .472  .000
1 The dependent variable is the real per capita GDP growth rate. Each growth regression includes an alternative
financial development  indicator, as specified in the column header. Liquidity is ratio of liquid liabilities of the
financial sysytem  to GDP. Private credit is the ratio of bank credit to private sector to GDP. Bank assets is ratio of
deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money banks domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets.
Central bank is the ratio of central bank domestic assets to GDP. Besides the financial development  indicators, the
regressions include the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP, the logarithm of initial secondary  school enrollment,
the ratio of government  consumption  expenditure to GDP, inflation  rate, ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, the
real interest rate, dummy  variables for 5-year periods. White's heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors are
given in parantheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance  levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
2 The dependent variable is the financial development  indicator listed in the column header. Regressions include a
constant.47
Table 11. Growth, Financial Development, Financial  Liberalization, and Banking Crises -
Financially  Repressed Countries
Liquidity  Private  Bank  Central
credit  assets  bank
Growth regressions'
financial development  .421  5.189**  4.466**  -2.865**
(2.217)  (2.266)  (2.018)  (1.453)
Adjusted  R2 .04  .12  .10  .08
No of observation  57  57  58  57
Financial development regressions 2
constant  .411***  .178***  .607***  .267***
(.065)  (.024)  (.048)  (.100)
financial liberalization dummy  .060  .163***  .183***  -.162*
(.073)  (.048)  (.058)  (.097)
banking crisis  -.085  -.022  -.009  .026
duummy  (.058)  (.061)  (.060)  (.079)
Adjusted R 2 .00  .08  .11  .02
No. of observations  64  64  66  64
aggregate impact on financial  -.025  .141***  .174**  -.136
development  F=.09  F=6.17  F=5.68  F=.97
coefficient  in growth regression  .421  5.189**  4.466***  -2.865**
impact on growth  -.011  .732  .777  .390
1  The dependent variable is the real per capita GDP growth rate. Each growth regression includes an alternative
financial development indicator, as specified in the column header. Liquidity is ratio of liquid liabilities of the
financial sysytem  to GDP. Private credit is the ratio of bank credit to private sector to GDP. Bank assets is ratio of
deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money banks domestic assets plus central bank domestic
assets.Central bank is the ratio of central bank domestic assets to GDP.  Besides the financial development
indicators, the regressions include the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP, the logarithm of initial secondary
school enrollment,  the ratio of government  consumption expenditure to GDP, inflation rate, ratio of exports plus
imports to GDP, the real interest rate, dunimy  variables for 5-year periods. White's heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors are given in parantheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance  levels of 10, 5 and I percent
respectively.
2 The dependent variable is the financial development  indicator listed in the column header. Regressions include a
constant.48
APPENDIX
Definitions  and  Data Sources  for Variables  Included  in the Logit  Regressions
Variable Name  Defnition  Source
Growth  Rate of growth of real GDP  IFS where available. Otherwise, WEO.
Tot change  Change in the terms of trade  WEO
Real interest rate  Nominal interest rate minus  1FS.  Where available,  nominal rate on
the contemporaneous  rate  short-term government securities.
of inflation  Otherwise, a rate charged by the Central
Bank to domestic banks such as the
discount rate; otherwise, the commercial
bank deposit interest rate
hiflation  Rate of change of the GDP  IFS
deflator
M2Jreserves  Ratio of M2 to foreign  M2 is money plus quasi-money (lines 34 +
exchange reserves of the  35 from the IFS) converted into US$.
Central Bank  Reserves are line ldd of the IFS.
Private/GDP  Ratio of domestic credit to  Domestic credit to the private sector is line
the private sector to GDP  32d from the IFS.
Cash/bank  Ratio of bank liquid  Bank reserves are line 20 of the IFS. Bank
reserves to bank assets  assets are lines 21 + lines 22a to 22f of the
IFS.
Credit growth  Rate of growth of real  IFS line 32d divided by the GDP deflator.
domestic credit to private
sector
GDP/CAP  Real GDP per capita  GDP data are from the World  Bank
National Accounts data base. Population is
IFS line 99z.
Law and order  Index ranging from 0 to 6  hiternational  Country Risk Guide (ICRG),
published by Political Risk Service,
Syracuse,  NY.
Bureaucratic delay  Index ranging from 0 to 4  Business Environmental  Risk Intelligence
(BERI), Washington DC
Contract enforcement  Index ranging from 0 to 4  BERI
Quality of bureaucracy  Index  ranging from 0 to 6  ICRG
Corruption  Index ranging from 0 to 6  ICROPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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